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NOTES
SECURITIES LAW-PARTNERSHIPS-ADOPTION OF AN EXPAN-
SIVE TEST FOR DEFINING A SECURITY. Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark.
602, 732 S.W.2d 836 (1987).
Glenn R. Schultz, who possessed an extensive background in law
and banking, approached J.A. McEntire, a banker, with a plan to
purchase an investment banking firm. Eight doctors and an art dealer
joined Schultz and McEntire in this endeavor and, with a total contri-
bution of $1,175,000.00,1 the group formed KGS Partners. The inves-
tors, many of whom previously participated in limited partnerships
where they lacked managerial control, agreed to form a general part-
nership so they could be involved in the management of the venture.
All of the partners agreed to use the partnership assets to purchase
the stock of Park, Ryan, Inc., a New York investment banking firm.
A provision in the partnership agreement specified that three of the
partners, Schultz, McEntire and a physician-investor, Kent West-
brook, would manage the partnership business.2
Park, Ryan, Inc. ultimately went into bankruptcy and the part-
ners liquidated KGS Partners. Appellant Casali, a physician investor,
filed suit for rescission, claiming that the sale of partnership units in
KGS Partners constituted a sale of securities which, if not exempt
from registration, should have been registered by the partners 3 under
the Arkansas Securities Act.4 The Pulaski County Circuit Court
1. A second solicitation raised an additional $875,000.00. Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark.
602, 603, 732 S.W.2d 836, 837 (1987).
2. The initial partnership interests were: Schultz, 12.8%; Westbrook, 8.5%; McEntire,
4.3%; other partners, 74.4%. Id. at 608, 732 S.W.2d at 839.
3. Of the three managing partners only two, Schultz and McEntire, were defendants in
this action. Westbrook was not a party. Id. at 602, 732 S.W.2d at 836.
4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-501 (1987) provides, "It is unlawful for any person to offer
or sell any security in this State unless: (1) It is registered under this chapter; or (2) The
security or transaction is exempted under §§ 23-42-503 or 23-42-504." ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-42-106(a)(1) (1987) states that "[a]ny person who [fails to register or obtain an exemp-
tion] is liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at six percent
(6%) per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount
of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the security and any income re-
ceived on it, or for damages if he no longer owns the security."
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ruled that the transaction was not a sale of securities as a matter of
law. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ar-
rangement constituted an "investment contract" subject to the provi-
sions of the Arkansas Securities Act.5 Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark. 602,
732 S.W.2d 836 (1987).
The problem raised in Casali, under what circumstances a part-
nership interest will be deemed a security, is one that has arisen under
both state and federal securities laws.6 Both the Arkansas Securities
Act7 and the federal securities statutes8 include within their definition
of security the amorphous term "investment contract."9 The cate-
gory of investment interests falling within the scope of "investment
contract" is quite broad, including such diverse interests as certificates
of deposit,' 0 pyramid sale arrangements," muskrats, 2 gold bars,' 3
leases of pregnant cows,' 4 and whiskey warehouse receipts.' 5
The federal definition of "investment contract" was first articu-
5. 292 Ark. at 606, 732 S.W.2d at 838. Since the court rendered the Casali decision prior
to recodification, the court cited to ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-1235 to -1261 (1966).
6. See Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Borchardt, 1988 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,642 (4th Cir. 1988); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
118 (1984); SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984); Odom v. Slavik, 703
F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981);
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978); McGreghar Land Co. v. Meguiar, 521
F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1975); Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); Sandusky Land,
Ltd., v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ohio 1975); New York Stock Ex-
change, Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark. 602, 732
S.W.2d 836 (1987); Fortier v. Ramsey, 136 Ga. App. 203, 220 S.E.2d 753 (1975); State v.
Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971).
7. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-42-106 to -508 (1987).
8. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
9. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-102(12) (1987) defines "security" as:
any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement; collateral-trust certifi-
cate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable share; investment con-
tract; variable annuity contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate of deposit for a
security; certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease
or out of production under such title or lease; or, in general, any interest or instru-
ment commonly known as a "security" or any certificate or interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing. (Emphasis added).
The federal securities statutes, which are similar to the Arkansas statutes, also include the term
"investment contract." Cf 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) and 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982).
10. Swank Federal Credit Union v. C.H. Wagner and Co., 405 F. Supp. 385 (D. Mass.
1975).
11. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. State v. Robbins, 185 Minn. 202, 240 N.W. 456 (1932).
13. SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors, Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
14. Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
15. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
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lated in SEC v. WJ. Howey Co. 16 where the United States Supreme
Court defined "investment contract" as "any contract, transaction, or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
third party."' 7 A few courts applied the Howey "solely from the ef-
forts of [others]" test literally, finding a modicum of participation by
the investor sufficient to insulate the arrangement from the reach of
securities laws.' 8 Such a mechanical approach to defining the term
"investment contract" is subject to criticism. 9
To avoid a literal application of the Howey test, some federal
courts apply a liberal construction to the term "solely." 2 SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.2 typifies this approach, where the
court's inquiry was "whether the efforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential manage-
rial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."22
The "investment contract" analysis is frequently applied to part-
nership offerings to determine if a particular arrangement constitutes
a transaction in securities. Limited partnership interests are almost
always found to be "investment contracts" subject to securities laws23
because limited partners by definition are passive investors who are
16. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
17. Id. at 298 (emphasis added). The Court held that an offering of a contract for the
purchase of individual rows of trees in an orange grove coupled with an arrangement for culti-
vating and marketing the product was an "investment contract." Most of the investors resided
in other states, had no experience in horticulture, and were completely dependent on the skill
and abilities of the sellers. See, e.g., Fitzgibbon, What is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on
Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893 (1980); Tew & Freed-
man, In support of SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the Eco-
nomic Relationship Between Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 407 (1973).
18. E.g., Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970);
Gallion v. Alabama Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968); Georgia Mar-
ket Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969).
19. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1973); State v.
Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 651-52, 485 P.2d 105, 111 (Hawaii 1971). See also
Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regula-
tion, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 145-46 (1971).
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. El-
kins & Co., 730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
21. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
22. Id. at 482.
23. E.g., Mayer v. Oil Field Systems Corp., 721 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1983); Goodman v.
Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978); McGreghar Land Co. v. Meguiar, 521 F.2d 822 (9th
Cir. 1975); Bayoud v. Ballard, 404 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Graham v. Kane, 264 Ark.
949, 576 S.W.2d 711 (1979).
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almost entirely dependent on the managerial efforts of the general
partner.24 However, courts prefer to look at substance rather than
form; if the limited partner retains significant decisional powers, the
arrangement may not be an "investment contract.
'25
Unlike limited partnerships, general partnerships and joint ven-
tures26 may grant all partners equal rights in the management and
control of the partnership business. 27 When general partners are ac-
tive participants and are not dependent on others for managerial con-
trol, their relationship is the antithesis of an arrangement that denotes
an "investment contract, ' 2 because the partners do not rely "solely
[on] the efforts of [others]."' 29  However, when an inactive partner
vests managerial control in others, his interest may be virtually indis-
tinguishable from that of a limited partner. In that case, the interest
of the general partner may constitute an "investment contract.
30
In Williamson v. Tucker31 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit identified three situations in which the interest in a
general partnership may be classified as a security:
A general partnership or joint venture interest can be designated a
security if the investor can establish . . . that (1) an agreement
among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the partner
or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would
a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperi-
24. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, codified in ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-44-101 to -
131 (1987), and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, codified in ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-43-101 to -1109 (1987), restrict the managerial control of the limited partner. In general,
the limited partner has no managerial authority, but can otherwise review the partnership
records, demand an accounting and seek a dissolution and winding up of the arrangement by a
court decree. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-44-110 (1987). ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-44-107 (1987)
states that "a limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to
the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the
business."
25. E.g., Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
26. For most purposes, including this discussion, a general partnership and a joint venture
are considered equivalent arrangements. A joint venture is usually undertaken to perform a
particular project, while the partnership has broader purposes. See generally, Mechem, The
Law of Joint Adventures, 15 MINN. L. REV. 644 (1931).
27. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-42-201(1) (1987) provides: "A partnership is an association of
two (2) or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
28. Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37
Mo. L. REV. 581, 612-15 (1972).
29. Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1983); Frazier v. Manson, 484 F. Supp. 449
(N.D. Tex. 1980); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1977); Romney v. Richard Prows, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 313 (D. Utah 1968).
30. See generally, Note, General Partnership Interests as Securities under the Federal Se-
curities Laws: Substance Over Form, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 303 (1985).
31. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
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enced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable
of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or
(3) the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique en-
trepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager
that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise
exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.32
The court's articulation of the second and third situations where se-
curities may be found is an expansion of the modified Howey test.
33
Recognizing that this is not an exclusive test, Williamson states that
"[t]hese are the only factors relevant to the issue [in this case]. But
this is not to say that other factors could not also give rise to such a
dependence on the promoter or manager that the exercise of partner-
ship powers would be effectively precluded."' 34  Williamson is cited
with general approval by the jurisdictions that have considered it.
35
The Arkansas Supreme Court first considered the issue whether
a general partnership or joint venture interest might be deemed a se-
curity in Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 36 in which it held that
offerings in a joint venture constituted "investment contracts. ' 37 In
Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. a real estate firm packaged a program con-
stituting the financing, construction and operation of an apartment
complex and marketed this program to passive investors 38 seeking a
tax shelter.39 The court applied a liberal reading of the definition of a
security and stated "that it is better to determine in each instance
from a review of all of the facts, whether an investment scheme or
plan constitutes an investment contract.... "4 In so doing, the court
did not adopt the Howey test,4 preferring instead the view adopted by
Minnesota in Minnesota v. Investors Security Corp.42 Subsequent to
32. Id. at 424.
33. Levinson, General Partnership Interests and the Securities Act of 1933." Recent Judicial
Developments, 10 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 463, 468 (1983).
34. 645 F.2d at 424 n.15.
35. Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Borchardt, 1988 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,642
(4th Cir. 1988); Deutsch Energy Co. v. Mazur, 813 F.2d 1567 (9th Cir. 1987); SEC v. Profes-
sional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F.
Supp. 781 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Pfohl v. Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. I11. 1983);
Morrison v. Pelican Land Dev., 1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,863 (N.D. II1. 1982).
36. 261 Ark. 769, 552 S.W.2d 4 (1977).
37. Id.
38. Ironically, one of the plaintiff investors in this case was Glenn R. Schultz, the defend-
ant in Casali v. Schultz.
39. 261 Ark. at 772-75, 552 S.W.2d at 6.
40. Id. at 781, 552 S.W.2d at 10.
41. See Note: A Definition of "Investment Contracts" and Equitable Defenses to Suit for
Recission for Nonregistration Under the Arkansas Securities Act, 1 UALR L.J. 366, 375 (1978).
42.. 297 Minn. 1, 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973). While Minnesota acknowledges that the Howey
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Rector-Philips-Morse, Inc., in Smith v. State4 3 the Arkansas Court of
Appeals adopted a modified "risk capital" 44 test for identifying a "se-
curity" involving a joint venture in a mobile phone enterprise. The
court listed the elements of this test:
(1) the investment of money or money's worth; (2) investment in a
venture; (3) the expectation of some benefit to the investor as a
result of the investment; (4) contribution towards the risk capital
of the venture; and (5) the absence of direct control over the invest-
ment or policy decisions concerning the venture.45
The court in Smith did not elaborate on its definition of a security, nor
did it explain the relationship between its test and the approach of
Rector-Philips-Morse, Inc.
46
Casali v. Schultz47 presented the Arkansas Supreme Court with
the opportunity to combine both the Williamson 48 test and the "risk
capital" 49 test articulated in Smith in its holding that the offerings in
KGS Partners constituted a security transaction. Articulating the
Williamson test,50 the court noted that the relationship between Casali
and Schultz satisfied the first factor because the "arrangement in fact
distributes power as would a limited partnership ... ."I1 In reaching
this conclusion, the court probed the power granted to Casali and
found that he possessed no managerial authority over the operation of
Park, Ryan, Inc.52
test is useful, it declines to adopt Howey as the exclusive test. Minnesota is a "merit state" for
purposes of securities registration, the effect of which is that Minnesota courts adopt an "ex-
pansive view of [the] securities statutes." Id. at 6, 209 N.W.2d at 409. Arkansas is also a
"merit state" (ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-405 (1987)), but the Rector-Philips-Morse, Inc., court
did not explicitly recognize the Arkansas "merit" registration provision in its decision to apply
the more expansive test. The Rector-Philips-Morse, Inc., court looked to the economic reality
of the transaction, stating that "by no means are all general partnerships or joint venture units
securities within the meaning of the Arkansas Securities Act. It is not the label that deter-
mines whether these units are securities, but the economic substance of the financing of the
venture." 261 Ark. at 782, 552 S.W.2d at 11. The court found that the joint venture units
were "securities," but, invoking laches, declined to provide relief to the plaintiffs. Id. at 788,
552 S.W.2d at 14.
43. 266 Ark. 861, 587 S.W.2d 50 (Ark. App. 1979).
44. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361
P.2d 906 (1961). See generally, Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security." Is There a
More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967).
45. 266 Ark. at 865, 587 S.W.2d at 52.
46. Id.
47. 292 Ark. 602, 732 S.W.2d 836 (1987).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
50. 292 Ark. at 605, 732 S.W.2d at 837-38.
51. Id. (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
52. Casali could not: 1) hire employees of Park Ryan; 2) fire the employees of Park Ryan;
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Although the court did not specifically address the second and
third components of the Williamson test,53 it implicitly applied these
factors to its analysis of the partnership arrangement.54 As to the sec-
ond factor, the court noted the differences in business sophistication
between Casali and Schultz by acknowledging the legal and business
background of Schultz" and stating that Casali "did not have any
training in business or management and had never traded in securi-
ties. His only other investment was in an 80 acre farm."56 Implicitly
applying the third factor of the Williamson test,57 the court stated that
"Schultz alone among the investors had the knowledge, experience,
and expertise necessary to operate an investment banking house.
5 8
Applying the flexible definition given the term "security" in Rec-
tor-Phillips-Morse, Inc. ," the court added that the legislative intent of
the broad definition accorded the term securities "was that, regardless
of the label on a document, the underlying economic substance of a
security is an arrangement where the investor is a mere passive con-
tributor of risk capital to a venture in which he has no direct or mana-
gerial control."'
The dissent stated that the supreme court could reverse the trial
court only if it found that the lower court "erred as a matter of law or
its findings were clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. "6
While the dissent agreed with the majority that "an arrangement
where the investor is a mere passive contributor of risk capital to a
venture in which he has no direct or managerial control" 62 is a secur-
ity, it averred that the partners were active, not passive investors.63
The dissent focused on the testimony of the parties, noting that one
partner stated that the investors "did not want a limited partnership
but instead wanted a general partnership in which everyone had a par-
3) trade securities for Park Ryan; 4) buy securities for Park Ryan; 5) sell securities for Park
Ryan; 6) set salaries for Park Ryan; 7) mortgage property of Park Ryan; 8) open bank ac-
counts; 9) sign checks; 10) incur any debts; 11) sell any assets; 12) determine how the stock of
Park Ryan would be voted. Id. at 604, 732 S.W.2d at 837.
53. See supra text accompanying note 32.
54. As phrased, the factors are alternatives, and only one need be present to find a security
under this test. 645 F.2d at 424.
55. 292 Ark. at 603, 732 S.W.2d at 836.
56. Id. at 604-05, 732 S.W.2d at 837.
57. Id. at 605, 732 S.W.2d at 838.
58. Id. at 604, 732 S.W.2d at 837.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
60. 292 Ark. at 605, 732 S.W.2d at 837.
61. Id. at 606, 732 S.W.2d at 838.




ticipation in the management."64 The dissent noted that one of the
physicians acted as a managing partner and that all partners partici-
pated in the decision-making process at monthly business meetings.65
Stating that the supreme court should not "weigh the evidence [or]
observe and. . . determine the credibility of the witnesses," the dissent
asserted that those functions were more properly within the scope of
the trial court. 6
By adopting the Williamson test the Arkansas Supreme Court
provides specific guidelines 67 for defining an "investment contract"
under Arkansas law. However, by continuing to recognize the modi-
fied "risk capital" test, the court appears willing to inquire into the
"economic reality" of the transaction, and not apply a specific
formula.68
The court's application of the Williamson analysis to the facts in
this case is questionable. Under this test, the court's initial inquiry
should focus on the extent of the powers of the complaining general
partner.69 Here, the court found that Casali possessed no managerial
authority over the affairs of Park, Ryan, Inc. By listing the manage-
ment functions of Park, Ryan, Inc. that were not under the direct
control of the general partners, the court implied that shareholders (in
this case KGS Partners) have significant management authority
which in fact is usually relegated to the board of directors or corpo-
rate officers.7"
Under the second prong of the Williamson test, courts probe the
business sophistication of the complaining general partner.71 But
business sophistication is not a bright-line test.7 2 Other jurisdictions
which make this inquiry reach disparate outcomes. 73 By not explic-
64. Id. at 607, 732 S.W.2d at 839.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 609, 732 S.W.2d at 840.
67. See supra text accompanying note 32.
68. By retaining the modified "risk capital" test, the court implicitly adopts the William-
son position that other factors might give rise to a security. 645 F.2d at 424 n.15.
69. See supra text accompanying note 32.
70. See 5 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2097 (rev. perm. ed. 1987). In gen-
eral, shareholders elect the board of directors which manage the corporation by appointing
corporate officers. "Generally, the powers of management vesting in the stockholders as a
body are very few." Id. at 501.
71. In Williamson the court found that the plaintiffs, who were business executives, pos-
sessed sufficient business sophistication even though their backgrounds did not include experi-
ence in real estate. 645 F.2d at 424.
72. See Soraghan, Private Offerings: Determining "Access," "Investment Sophistication,"
and "Ability to Bear Economic Risk," 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 23-24 (1980).
73. In Morrison v. Pelican Land Development, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,863 (N.D.
Ill. 1982), the court found that investments in a condominium project by a policeman having a
376 [Vol. 11:369
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itly applying the second factor to its analysis of the KGS Partners
arrangement, the court failed to provide interpretive guidance as to
the level of business sophistication required of a partner for a finding
that the agreement does not constitute a security.
Judicial inquiry into the third factor of the Williamson test fo-
cuses on promoter or managerial dependence.74 Even though the
partnership agreement may grant the partners the right to fire the
manager, that grant is merely illusory if, by exercising that right, the
partners forfeit the skill and ability of the manager upon whose shoul-
der is borne the success of the enterprise."5 The Casali court should
have inquired whether the talents and abilities of Schultz were unique.
Under the usual methods of corporate organization, shareholders se-
lect the board of directors who in turn hire the corporate officers.16
Nothing in the record suggests that a majority of the partners could
not cause KGS Partners, as the sole shareholder controlling Park,
Ryan's board, to find and hire another individual to manage the daily
operations of Park, Ryan, Inc. According to Williamson, "a partner-
ship can be an investment contract only when the partners are so de-
pendent on a particular manager that they cannot replace him. . .. "'
The Casali decision evinces a willingness on the part of the court
to closely scrutinize partnership arrangements to accommodate its ex-
pansive reading of "investment contract." Features of an agreement
which fall within this expansive reading run the risk of subjecting the
agreement to the aegis of securities laws. "To find a 'security' is to
subject a transaction to regulation governing: (1) the process of the
security's creation and distribution; (2) the process of trading in the
security; and (3) matters associated with holding the security."78 In-
dividuals who participate in partnerships, or draft partnership agree-
ments, will undoubtedly want to exercise immense care to avoid the
high school education presented a triable question of fact as to the issue of a security. In
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Borchardt, 1988 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,642 n.7 (4th
Cir. 1988), the court, per Powell, J., stated that inquiry into the business expertise of each
partner "would undercut the strong presumption that an interest in a general partnership is
not a security." However, in Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1986), the court
found that a physician investor in a real estate venture had sufficient business sophistication.
Unlike Casali, Youmans engaged in other business transactions unconnected with the opera-
tors in the disputed venture.
74. See supra text accompanying note 32.
75. See Morgenstern, Real Estate Joint Venture Interests as Securities: The Implications of
Williamson v. Tucker, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1231, 1256 (1982).
76. See FLETCHER, supra note 70.
77. 645 F.2d at 424.




"investment contract trap." Failure to obtain an exemption or to reg-
ister the security may subject the promoter or manager to both civil79
and criminal80 actions.
To avoid this "trap," the careful drafter of a partnership agree-
ment might include provisions for the following: 1) the approval of
all major decisions by a majority vote, with regular meetings held to
keep the partners apprised of the partnership business;8' 2) the exclu-
sion of an investor who lacks business sophistication or, in the alter-
native, appointment of a sophisticated agent to act in his behalf; 3) the
establishment of a fixed time period for the manager's right to man-
age, with choice of a replacement manager left to the investors; and
4) allowing the investors to remove the manager and appoint a re-
placement.82 Since the Casali court was concerned about the lack of
investor power in the daily management of the corporation (Park,
Ryan, Inc.),8 3 participants in agreements involving control of corpo-
rations should insure that all partners have a voice in the operations
of the corporation. Granting officer or director positions to the gen-
eral partners may assist in this goal. Alternatively, general partner-
ships might be advised to avoid investing in corporations.
Charles P. Turley
79. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-42-106 to -508 (1987).
80. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-104(b) (1987) makes a "knowing" violation a Class D fel-
ony. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-104(c) (1987) makes a "negligent" violation a Class A
misdemeanor.
81. This provision alone might not be sufficient since in the Casali arrangement meetings
were held on a monthly basis and decisions were voted on by the partners. See supra text
accompanying note 65.
82. See generally, Morgenstern, supra note 75, at 1265.
83. See supra note 52.
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